by Mokhtar Ben mlouka (Policy Intern at CELI)
Environmental decoupling is commonly presented as the central mechanism through which environmental sustainability could be reconciled with continued economic growth. Under this framework, technological progress and efficiency gains would allow GDP to increase while environmental pressures, particularly those of carbon emissions, decline. This idea has shaped climate policy discourse for decades.
This article will demonstrate which aspects of environmental decoupling have faced the most difficulties and what goals have not been achieved at the required scale, speed, or scope.
Defining Green Growth and Environmental Decoupling
Before assessing the feasibility of green growth and decoupling, it is necessary to clarify its meaning. In most policy and academic contexts, green growth is defined as a situation in which economic growth continues while environmental pressures decline. In practice, this usually refers to a simultaneous increase in GDP and a decrease in CO₂ emissions. To a lesser extent however, green growth is also associated with declining resource use, biodiversity loss, or other environmental impacts. However, the scientific literature overwhelmingly focuses on carbon emissions. This narrow focus already limits the relevance of green growth as a comprehensive sustainability strategy.[1]
The Conditions for Meaningful Decoupling
For decoupling to be meaningful, several strict conditions must be met. First, decoupling must be absolute. Emissions must decline in absolute terms and not just grow more slowly than GDP. A marginal decline in emissions combined with weak growth does not constitute success. Second, it must be net. Emissions generated by imports and exports must be included. Territorial emissions alone are misleading in a globalised economy. Third, decoupling must be long-term. Short episodes of declining emissions are insufficient. Fourth, decoupling must be global. Since carbon dioxide has no borders, national success is irrelevant if global emissions continue to rise. Finally, decoupling must be fast as climate constraints impose strict time limits and slow reductions are incompatible with remaining carbon budgets. These criteria set a high bar. They are rarely met in practice.
COVID-19 Emissions Drop
The year 2020 briefly revived optimism around decoupling. Global CO₂ emissions declined significantly, largely due to economic shutdowns during the COVID-19 pandemic. Some observers interpreted this as proof that emissions reductions were achievable. This interpretation however was misleading as the emissions decline was driven by a global recession and not structural change. In 2021, as economic activity resumed, emissions rebounded almost entirely. Global fossil CO₂ emissions increased by approximately 4.2%, returning close to pre-pandemic levels.[2]
Carbon Budgets and the Impossibility of Gradual Decoupling
The issue is that every year that passes without structural reductions increases the difficulty of meeting climate targets. The persistence of green growth narratives creates false hope and delays necessary action. The strongest empirical argument against green growth comes from carbon budget analysis. The IPCC estimates that to limit warming to 1.5°C, the remaining global carbon budget is approximately 500 GtCO₂.[3] Current global emissions are around 40 GtCO₂ per year. At this rate, the entire budget would be exhausted within little more than a decade. Even under a 2°C target, the available budget is rapidly shrinking. Such figures leave little room for gradualism. Additionally, the UNEP estimated in 2019 that emissions would need to decline by approximately 7.6% per year to remain on a 1.5°C pathway. Since then, emissions have increased rather than decreased.
Historical decoupling rates are also far below what is required. Warlenius shows that assuming realistic decoupling rates makes continued economic growth incompatible with climate targets.[4] The problem is not only whether decoupling exists, but whether it can occur fast enough. And the evidence shown above suggests it cannot.
Why Observed Decoupling Falls Short?
Given these constraints, it is legitimate to ask whether green growth has ever occurred. Some studies identify partial or temporary decoupling at the national level. Le Quéré et al. document periods where emissions declined in certain high-income countries. Haberl et al., in a meta-analysis of 835 studies, identify cases of relative decoupling. However, none of these cases satisfy all the criteria for meaningful decoupling[5] The overwhelming number of studies shows that the occurring decoupling is often local, short-lived, or driven by outsourcing. When consumption-based emissions are considered, the figures become even more negative. And most importantly, the so called carbon colonialism[6], exercised by wealthier countries, as Parrique et al. show, the apparent success in wealthy countries often reflects the relocation of carbon-intensive production to other poorer regions.⁶ making the net effect of local decoupling meaningless.
The Fossil Fuel Dependency
Another challenge to decoupling is that for it to be true, a rapid phase-out of fossil fuels is required. As there are no alternative pathways without giving up on them. Welsby et al. estimate that to retain a 50% chance of limiting warming to 1.5°C, approximately 90% of known coal reserves and 60% of oil and gas reserves must remain unextracted.⁷ This requirement is fundamentally incompatible with current energy trajectories especially due to our great dependency on these cheap energy resources for manufacturing, heating, and fuel. Additionally, entire supply chains and elaborate infrastructure exists around fossil fuels.
Divergence of Energy Pathways : China, the USA and Europe
In 2021, consumption of coal, oil, and gas all increased[7]. China, which had pledged carbon neutrality by 2060 and to “peak” emissions before 2030, has seen growth in absolute terms in coal consumption and new coal power capacity. A review of China’s energy statistics[8] shows that primary energy consumption in 2021 continued to be dominated by coal (about 55 % in 2021), and that China opened new coal capacity in that year even as renewables grew. Implications of carbon neutrality goals in China’s power investments highlights that deep decarbonization consistent with climate pledges would require avoiding new coal plant builds, yet under business-as-usual planning, peripheral coal investment and infrastructure remain quite substantial.
As for the United States, which has made climate pledges (including Biden’s GHG reduction targets), many sources show a continued expansion and approval of fossil fuel infrastructure. An assessment of global fossil fuel investment and policy[9] notes that despite climate goals, the U.S. approved new fossil fuel infrastructure projects including pipelines, oil and gas projects as part of broader “all-of-the-above” energy strategies, including during and after 2021. A U.S. Department of Energy review of energy sector infrastructure[10] shows that vast fossil fuel infrastructure (natural gas pipelines, extraction sites) remains under development or planned, which can lock in fossil energy pathways and hurt the transition.
For Europe however, the situation is quite distinct, as rather than expanding fossil fuels, EU strategy emphasized renewable growth within an economic strategy framed by the Green Deal and energy security goals. A review of EU renewable energy transition shows that Europe has shifted rapidly and successfully toward renewable energy[11], with renewables gradually replacing fossil fuels in the energy mix in a consistent manner with growth-oriented strategies focused on clean energy technology. Recent reports show that wind and solar generation together generated more electricity than fossil fuels in Europe as of 2025[12],
Beyond Carbon :
Environmental sustainability however is not only limited to carbon emissions, but the other indicators do not show better results. In terms of global material consumption, it has nearly quadrupled across a span of 50 years, reaching over 100 billion tonnes annually. Since the Paris Agreement alone, the global economy has consumed approximately 500 billion tonnes of virgin materials[13].
Recycling rates remain extremely low. The Circularity Gap Report estimates a global circularity rate of only 8.6%.[14] These figures directly contradict claims that a circular economy can decouple growth from resource use at scale. Biodiversity indicators also show similar trends. With species loss continuing at unprecedented rates, as a direct result of intensified land use change, extraction, and infrastructure expansion. A recent study[15] shows that cumulative net global potential species loss grew by ~1.4 % from 1995 to 2022, with a decrease in biodiversity impacts in some regions being far exceeded by increases in tropical land conversion. The Living Planet Index, which is a widely used scientific biodiversity indicator, shows an average 69% decline in monitored wildlife populations between 1970 and 2018.
[1] Parrique, T. et al. Decoupling Debunked. European Environmental Bureau, 2019.
[2] Jackson, R. B. et al. “Global Fossil CO₂ Emissions in 2021.” Environmental Research Letters, 2022.
[3] IPCC. AR6 Working Group I, Summary for Policymakers, 2021.
[4] Parrique, T. et al., 2019.
[5] Welsby, D. et al. “Unextractable Fossil Fuels.” Nature, 2021.
[6] Carbon Colonialism: How Rich Countries Export Climate Breakdown
Book by Laurie Parsons
[7] BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2022
[8] BRIEFING International progress on climate action EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service Authors: Gregor Erbach and Ulrich Jochheim – October 2022 China’s climate change policies State of play ahead of COP27
[9] Shaye Wolf, Robert Bullard, Jonathan J Buonocore, Nathan Donley, Trisia Farrelly, John Fleming, David J X González, Naomi Oreskes, William Ripple, Robin Saha, Mary D Willis, Scientists’ warning on fossil fuels, Oxford Open Climate Change, Volume 5, Issue 1, 2025, kgaf011,
[10] 2021–2024 FOUR-YEAR REVIEW OF SUPPLY CHAINS FOR THE ENERGY SECTOR INDUSTRIAL BASE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY DECEMBER 2024
[11] Wojtaszek, H. Renewable Energy in Policy Frameworks: A Comparative Analysis of EU and Global Strategies for Sustainable Development. Sustainability 2025, 17, 10567. https://doi.org/10.3390/su172310567
[12] Le Monde, In 2025, wind and solar electricity production in Europe surpassed that of fossil fuels
[13] CGR 2025 A circular economy to live within the safe limits of the planet
[14] Circle Economy. Circularity Gap Report 2022.
[15] Cabernard, L., Pfister, S. & Hellweg, S. Biodiversity impacts of recent land-use change driven by increases in agri-food imports. Nat Sustain 7, 1512–1524 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-024-01433-4
